Cut the "Critical Capabilities Gap" Crap

Don't make the purportedly "perfect" the enemy of the good. Europeans should stop undermining their own deterrence.

I don’t think Europeans understand how to talk about defense and deterrence. That may seem like an outrageous statement coming from a diplomat who retired more than a decade ago, devoted most but not all of his career to political-military matters and never achieved a position of much real authority. I will nonetheless run it out there because I believe it reflects two fundamental flaws in the drive for Europe’s strategic autonomy in defense and deterrence (which I care about deeply):

• First, an impulse to focus on a “critical capabilities gap” arising from the increasingly evident reduction and even withdrawal of credible American defense commitments, including Article 5 of the Washington (NATO) Treaty. This is leading to a perversely exaggerated and warped level of ambition in terms of procurement as Europe contemplates the path toward defense and deterrence autonomy.

• Second, an impulse to state - publicly, persistently, and to my mind foolishly - that Europe is not, at present, able to defend itself without the active support and perhaps leading involvement of the United States. Not only that - that Europe will not be able to defend itself on its own for some years to come, perhaps a decade. Perhaps even never. This leads to casting the present and near future as a time of great - and exaggerated - vulnerability, thereby undermining deterrence.

The “Perfect” Is the Enemy of the Good - and of Common Sense

This corrosive combination has created a political and strategic muddle where the perfect is the enemy of the good. By “perfect”, I mean the current, U.S.-supported and indeed U.S.-led defense and deterrence model for Europe, though that model’s severe shortcomings are apparent for all to see. Let’s just say there is really nothing remotely perfect about U.S. defense planning, however robust it purports to be; the examples run from Iraq to Afghanistan to Libya to Yemen to Iran and surely many points in between. American tactical proficiency is high; so what? We have lost a series of wars and near-wars stretching back well over two decades. Now we are losing tactically, operationally and strategically to Iran. Nor is there anything remotely perfect about the reliability of American defense and deterrence commitments in Europe, a situation that has been exacerbated and highlighted by the Trump Regime but originated far, far earlier.

And let me be clear where I stand on another point: I believe Europe’s perception of the threat of Russian aggression beyond Ukraine is exaggerated. Russia is weaker than much of the “Russia threat” discourse suggests. Moscow’s intent is clearly hostile. There is no discounting the devastation that Russia has wrought in its illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine, nor the potentially destabilizing impact that war could still have for the broader region. Nor can one discount Russia’s aggressive posture toward Europe, its campaign of sabotage and disruption in the Baltic and much more broadly. I would simply argue that Moscow is in no position to launch a war of conquest against a NATO or EU member state. It is too weak and Europe is too strong.

But I would also argue that the way in which many Europeans discuss the Russia threat, and their readiness to deter and if necessary repel it, is creating its own set of vulnerabilities and invites more Russian meddling.

The Critical Capabilities Gap

It seems you can’t read anything about European defense and deterrence without encountering discussion of the “critical capabilities gap” that Europeans must cover should U.S. commitments to European defense disappear. These capabilities generally include what are now called “long-range fires”, air defense and missile defense, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), electronic warfare, sometimes heavy airlift and even, on occasion, command and control. The list is long, the cost of replacing it is high, and the timetable for doing so is measured in years.

And then there is nuclear deterrence.

I don’t have a big problem with the details of the list. I think they are rather outmoded and misguided, but many experts would insist they comprise a sensible “to-do” list for Europe. Still, I have serious reservations about the concept of the list, the outlook on national defense and defense planning that underpins what looks to me like an obsession with the “gap”.

• First, it seems to ignore what recent wars, most notably the Russo-Ukrainian War and the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, have revealed about the nature of modern warfare: that it is not in line with American defense doctrine, and that the Pentagon seems slow and perhaps even unable to adapt. On the one hand, there is widespread discussion of the transformative lessons of these two recent wars. Nobody has done more than Philipps O’Brien to bring these discussions to a wide audience regarding both Ukraine and Iran. On the other hand, the tradition of U.S.-led defense planning in Europe endures, even when the role of America is increasingly unclear.

• Second, the “gap” obsession seems to rest on the assumption that deterrence can be perfected to such a degree - even conventional deterrence - that perceived or expected resilience under attack is somehow eliminated from the equation. In other words, there is no real need for political resolve. Of course, the best wars are those that never happen. But Ukraine’s and Iran’s resilience under attack by more powerful foes has driven home the lessons from their wars; resilience coupled with a revolution in technology and cost-benefit, bang-for-your-buck calculations, a transformation in the advantage of defense over offense. I would argue that the failure of deterrence in the cases of Ukraine and Iran has rewritten the book on deterrence going forward. It has elevated the prospects for successful defense, thereby transforming what is needed to deter a potential aggressor, lowering the price tag and shifting the focus. It is about political resolve and of course innovation as well as technical capabilities. The human factor is tremendously important.

• Finally, nuclear deterrence should be center-stage for Europe, much more than “long-range fires” or strategic lift. Non-proliferation advocates argue strenuously against the notion that Ukraine, Iran, and even Libya show that North Korea was right. Their caution on this point is understandable but unpersuasive. Breakout to even a minor nuclear deterrence capability is transformative in facing down potential aggressors. It is hard to believe that Ukraine or Iran would have been subjected to the horrors of aggression that they now face had they possessed a nuclear deterrent capability. While one can argue that proliferation is dangerous, and that each situation is different and needs to be addressed separately, the case for a credible, common European nuclear deterrent seems clear to me. Perhaps even more than one, nationally-based deterrents. Developing such a deterrent/deterrents will be costly and politically difficult, but the rest of the world should not worry. Least of all the United States. I have no doubt that Europe will behave much more responsibly with its own nuclear deterrent(s) than Israel has with its nuclear capability over the past five decades.

The Central Place of Germany and Merz

The past two weeks have seen a lot of reporting and handwringing over the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance - perhaps even more than usual. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has taken center stage, with a good deal of back and forth over his critical remarks to high-schoolers in the German provinces about Iran’s “humiliation” of America and the instant fallout in relations with Washington: a rushed announcement of a previously planned draw-down of U.S. forces in Germany, and an increase in tariffs on European auto imports to the United States. Some of the reporting noted that Merz’s polling numbers are in the tank, inviting the usual media handwringing over the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland and far-right populists across Europe. Was it worth it for Merz to say such a thing? Was it a sign of his penchant for miscues? Was it inevitable? Was it strategic?

Here is fairly representative article, taken from The Guardian, on the Merz situation:

Guardian Merz Stuck

Much of the angst over Merz’s falling out with Trump and the grim polling numbers that he and his CDU/CSU-SPD coalition government face, at least on this side of the Atlantic, arises from hopes that Merz and Germany will lead European defense efforts over the coming decade, moving the Continent toward greater capability and potentially even strategic autonomy. It is hard to reconcile those hopes with the challenges that the Merz government is facing in economic policy, electoral politics, and foreign affairs. This disconnect is prompting a lot of worry - as is very often the case among Germany-watchers both inside and outside Deutschland.

It will come as no surprise to readers here that I find such hopes for Germany to be exaggerated. But they are not entirely misplaced: Merz and Berlin have indeed moved out on a more serious effort to bolster Germany’s (and Europe’s) defense capabilities than one might have expected a couple years ago. They have broken taboos from the Debt Brake to nuclear deterrence and channeled massive resources to Ukraine in its war with Russia.

The potential is there.

The huge defense build-out undertaken by the Merz government and Germany is important and impressive. It is also very German, heavy on method and domestic investment focus. It is natural that the government and German taxpayers want procurement plans to support domestic producers, even if this tends to complicate the development of an integrated European defense industrial complex (with crucial economies of scale) and provoke some of the security dilemma concerns that are inevitably connected to German rearmament. Timothy Garton Ash has written a fine piece for The Guardian on the questions surrounding just how “European” Germany’s defense plans really are:

Garton Ash Germany Europe

These are important issues. But my present concern lies elsewhere, with the timetable for both Germany and Europe, how they talk about it, and what it means for European dependence on the U.S. and effective deterrence.

Here, too, Germany plays a central role. I want Germany and Europe to succeed. Germany’s timetable is ambitious, as it should be.

Talk Defense and Deterrence Like You Mean It

What would I like to see change? For one thing, perhaps most importantly for me, the way Germany (and Europe) talks about the project of increasing self-reliance or autonomy in defense and deterrence. Merz, Berlin, and other Europeans should say they can defend themselves right now. Because they can. They have the capacity to repel any attack, to defend themselves against any potential adversary. With our without the United States. It will be easier if Washington lives up to its promises, however unlikely that may now appear. But it will only be harder, not impossible, for Europe to defend itself without the U.S. Europeans’ proclaimed objective should be to reinforce their deterrent, build out their autonomous capability, to achieve full autonomy as soon as possible on the foundation of the defense and deterrent capabilities that exist today.

This is about more than window-dressing or talking points. It concerns how national - or in this case both national and European - defense and deterrence are conceived and discussed. It is about treating both responsibilities and threats seriously. Right now.

In this sense, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s behavior and statements - his creepy deference to Trump, his derisive approach to his fellow Europeans - are more than just humiliating. They are destructive and damaging to Europe’s defense and deterrence. His dismissive statement to the European Parliament in January distills his misguided position at a time of profound strategic transformation:

“If anyone here thinks that the European Union, or Europe as a whole, can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming,” he scoffed. “You can’t. We can’t.”

Rutte is not just wrong. He is a dangerous fool.

European defense is a project that is still under construction. There is no question that it requires further work, work on decision-making structures and procurement arrangements and capabilities and a nuclear deterrent to replace the U.S. But Europe’s need to deter potential aggressors, and defend itself if attacked, with or without the U.S., already exists. It begins now.

Over the coming years, Europe should enhance its autonomous defense and deterrence capabilities. Germany should be central to these efforts, and can contribute very seriously to advancing this agenda. There are obstacles in the way - practical, defense-industrial, budgetary, political. This is only to be expected in such an important undertaking.

But Europe can defend itself today. With or without the United States. Europeans need to say so. Otherwise, they undermine their own deterrence. And believe me, they cannot rely on the Trump Regime or the United States.